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Abstract: In my thesis I examine the impact of natural disaster declarations on
socioeconomic outcomes. I use counties that requested, but did not receive, a natural
disaster declaration as controls for treatment counties that received the requested
declaration. I construct a county-by-year panel dataset covering 2005 to 2016. I estimate
a difference-in-differences model to estimate socioeconomic outcomes resulting from the
disaster declaration decision. I find that receiving a declaration was associated with a 0.8
percentage point poverty reduction in 2010, but no other years or changes in
socioeconomic outcomes were causally and significantly established by my model.
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I.

Introduction
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was formally created

in 1979 under President Carter to combine multiple agencies involved in emergency
management and civil defense under one umbrella organization. FEMA was founded as an
organization to provide federal aid to states, territories, and tribal lands to mitigate
disasters, prepare for them, and recover.1 Since the conception of FEMA as an agency,
however, they have taken on an increasingly crucial role in supporting U.S. communities
on the individual, infrastructural, and public levels. For its first 10 years, FEMA declared
on average around 27 disasters per year.2 The number of disasters and emergencies FEMA
manages has since increased to an average of 135 disasters per year.3 The increase in
FEMA declared disasters is suggestive of both an uptick in U.S. natural disaster events,
and an increasing local dependence on federal financial aid. FEMA has given out over 36
billion USD since 2005 in public assistance disaster grants alone. The agency is clearly an
essential pillar and enormous safety net for communities at risk of natural disaster damages.
However, with that power comes the potential to increase existing inequities and harm
communities if they are not thoughtful about the allocation of declarations and aid.
There are innumerable costs associated with natural disasters from short term,
immediate costs such as property damage and medical expenses to longer term costs that
can compound over time like lower educational attainment during the time of the disaster.
When examining the natural disaster recovery process, it is important to consider on whom

1

< https://www.fema.gov/about/history> Accessed January 22, 2021.
<https://www.fema.gov/disasters/historic> Accessed February 5, 2021.
3
*2007-2017 average, <https://www.fema.gov/disasters/historic> Accessed February 5, 2021.
2
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these costs are primarily falling and how recovery may vary across communities depending
on factors like income. Not only should we care about the long-term distributional impacts
of natural disasters for basic equity reasons, but they may also have a bearing on the ability
for a community to recover from and respond to future disaster events. At a time where the
annual disaster count is on a strong upward trend and with so much essential aid at stake;
it is important to examine how these relief funds are distributed through individuals, state
governments, and local governments.
My paper seeks to expand on past disaster literature by joining analysis on the
impacts of disaster aid with the factors contributing to the allocation of aid. I utilize data
on all FEMA disaster declarations as well as all requested disaster declarations which
FEMA did not declare between 2005 and 2016. I use this quasi-natural experiment and a
difference-in-differences framework to analyze socioeconomic outcomes in the presence
of federal aid. First, I provide background information and a brief literature review on the
means of FEMA declaration, natural disaster frequency, and environmental justice. I
review past literature on U.S. natural disaster recovery and the impacts and motivations of
FEMA aid. I will then provide summary statistics for the declaration versus no declaration
conditioned groups as well as difference of means tests on all covariates of interest. I then
proceed to a probit analysis of the factors which increase or decrease the likelihood of
receiving a declaration, and find that electoral value, race, and disaster type all significantly
influence whether a county’s declaration request is approved. Finally, I outline my primary
model and DID analysis results and interpretations, along with discussion of my event
study validation results.
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II.

Background and Relevant Literature
The process of FEMA disaster evaluation and declaration was in large part written

by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93288). The Stafford Act adjusted not only the parameters of disaster classification, but where
the budgetary power lies for emergency response. The Stafford Act gave the President the
power to declare a national emergency, and once an emergency is declared FEMA has the
power to provide aid primarily from the “President's Disaster Relief Fund”. Under this
current model only the President has the power to declare a national emergency in response
to localized disasters. Therefore, the President wields a staggering amount of unilateral
power over whether or not state and local governments overwhelmed by a natural disaster
will get federal assistance. The actions and level of FEMA assistance and intervention are
overseen by a congressional committee. However, without a disaster declaration the federal
government bears no obligation to assist.
Natural disasters globally are getting more frequent and costlier. The global
costs of weather-related disasters have increased from $8.9 billion USD annually (19771986) to $45.1 billion a year (1997-2006) and continues to rise (Bouwer et al. 2007).
Hallegatte (2014) summarizes the expected trends in natural disasters and analyzes their
costs under the various climate change scenarios used by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. Generally speaking, climate models can predict increasing likelihoods of
disasters, but there is still uncertainty around the way it will manifest in different regions.
This means that certain regions may be severely under equipped to mitigate future hazards
associated with a changing climate. The challenge of mitigation and increase in losses will
serve to make disaster recovery efforts more essential in the future, and thus the economic
6

impacts of disaster relief and emergency management agencies like FEMA will only
become more pronounced over time.
Past research has looked at data on severity of natural disaster events and the
subsequent FEMA decision to declare a disaster in the period over 1991 to 1999 (Garrett
& Sobel 2003). Garrett and Sobel (2003) run a Poisson model on the number of FEMA
declarations at the state level, controlling for severity of disaster as well as demographic,
electoral value, and election year variables. By interpreting the marginal effects of their
analysis, they are able to estimate the factors that contribute most heavily to the likelihood
of receipt of a FEMA declaration and disaster aid. The researchers find that only about half
of disaster aid can be explained by the severity of a given disaster, and much of the
determination of whether or not a state receives FEMA disaster declaration has to do with
their electoral value and if it is an election year (Garrett & Sobel 2003).
Both the short- and long-term economic consequences of natural disasters have
been a heavily researched subject for decades. Research has long supported a narrative of
disaster resilience in the United States. Case studies and empirical research have most
commonly examined these impacts in the wake of hurricanes, while I expand natural
disaster analysis to include all eight FEMA disaster classifications: severe storm, severe
ice storm, hurricane, typhoon, earthquake, tornado, flood, and fire. Deryugina (2007) uses
an event study to estimate the impact hurricanes have on government transfers, wages, and
unemployment on the aggregated county level post natural disaster and finds no significant
drop in earnings or employment. By analyzing counties impacted by hurricanes in both the
short term (0-4 years) and the long term (5-10), she finds that government transfers are
likely able to offset a significant amount of the damages and wage loss resulting from
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natural disasters. Likewise, Pleninger (2020) finds that in the year of a disaster, counties
have on average similar distributional characteristics in spite of a decrease in income across
the population. She examines FEMA declared disasters between 1996 and 2017 through a
panel fixed-effects regression model to determine drivers of inequality and changes within
income groups. Pleninger (2020) suggests that adverse socioeconomic consequences are
most concentrated in the middle class, and thus inequality and poverty rates remain fairly
stable through natural disasters and recovery. This narrative of the strength of our
socioeconomic system’s ability to stand up to natural disasters has been perpetuated by
analysis of several major disasters. Notably, Shaughnessy et al. study a pre and post
Hurricane Katrina New Orleans to find that the local Gini coefficient actually decreased
after the disaster (Shaughnessy 2010). These bodies of research suggest great confidence
in our disaster safety nets including direct disaster aid, unemployment insurance, income
maintenance payments, and public medical assistance. There is still uncertainty behind
these results, however, because in the large-scale disasters studied, the most economically
disadvantaged populations may be unable to return to the area and therefore be uncounted
in later time series data.
Schulz and Elliott (2013) conducted an analysis which diverges from the previous
narrative of community-level economic rebound success from disasters. They analyze what
they identify as a “recovery machine”: the way in which conferrals of private and public
aid seem to “boost rather than discourage uneven growth and development in affected areas
over the long run” (Schulz & Elliott 2013). Those in middle- and upper-income groups are
able to receive financial windfalls through both government assistance and private
insurance claims. Particularly those in high-value areas with more assets often see a net
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benefit from disasters while individuals below or near the poverty line are net negatively
impacted (Schulz & Elliott 2013). The researchers find that in disaster-stricken areas there
is greater socioeconomic inequality and income polarity than before the disaster. Even
more troubling, these impacts appear to be amplified for non-white populations. Schulz &
Elliott (2013) analyzed the percent change in family income and percent change in poverty
populations for a multitude of variables and found that non-white groups saw a decrease in
household income and increase in poverty percentage, both significant at the one percent
level. Not only is it clear that the interplay between private and public disaster relief has
the potential to create an equity issue, but it is an environmental justice concern as well.
Schulz and Elliot only focus on demographic shifts in disaster-stricken areas which
did receive a FEMA disaster declaration. In my paper I hope to examine this “recovery
machine” further by analyzing differences in socioeconomic outcomes between counties
impacted by a natural disaster which received FEMA aid versus those that requested FEMA
aid, but did not receive it. As FEMA is far and away the largest provider of public
assistance in the wake of disasters, I will be able to isolate the federal response impacts on
inequality and economic outcomes from the solely private, state, and local disaster
response. This analysis can help understand whether this recovery machine is truly
propelled by FEMA; or primarily driven by state, local, and private mechanisms. By
looking at socioeconomic changes on a county level I will be able to determine whether
FEMA support is a driver of the inequality associated with the recovery machine or a savior
for lower income populations whose recovery would otherwise be outpaced by aid from
the private sector.

9

Racial disparities in environmental vulnerability and safety are a growing literature
which focuses on the intersection of race and disaster impact. This literature has grown
particularly since Hurricane Katrina in 2004 where the damages from a catastrophic
disaster disproportionately impacted the Black population in the geographics affected. Not
only was Hurricane Katrina a harsh reminder of the greater environmental vulnerability of
the Black population in the U.S., but the government response with little to no immediate
relief left New Orleans residents with a difficult road ahead for disaster recovery (Bolin &
Kurtz 2018).
Another example given by Bolin and Kurtz (2018) is that of flooding in El Paso, Texas.
Most high-income individuals in El Paso live up on a hillside for many reasons including
less pollution, less congestion, and aesthetics. When El Paso was hit with a series of floods
in 2006, the wealthier individuals at higher elevation were protected from home damage
and personal injury, whereas the predominantly Mexican and Latino inhabited low-income
colonias were severely inundated and damaged during the floods (Bolin & Kurtz 2018).
These colonias acted as informal settlements for thousands of low-income Hispanic
individuals, a large majority of whom lack U.S. documentation. While the rich hillside
homes that were inherently less exposed to the floods were able to fall back on flood
insurance and FEMA payments if they were damaged, people in the colonias found
themselves unable to take advantage of either. Flood insurance is a private good that many
low-income individuals cannot afford. Additionally, because many impacted people were
undocumented, they were ineligible for aid from FEMA (Bolin & Kurtz 2018). Not only
were undocumented people excluded from FEMA aid, but until fairly recently FEMA only
provided flood insurance information in English (Bolin & Kurtz 2018). Therefore, non-
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English speakers found themselves unable to take advantage of essential FEMA aid
payments. This implies that even in the cases where a county receives a FEMA declaration
and subsequent aid, there very well may be unequal receipt of benefits within the county.
Natural disasters can be devastating to any community affected, but there is an inherently
greater vulnerability for lower income communities. There is typically a risk premium
associated with living in an area with known disaster risk, thereby lowering home prices
and making them more attractive to low-income individuals. In the United States, this
clustering of low-income individuals in more vulnerable and hazardous areas is
intrinsically linked to race.

III.

Data and Descriptive Analysis

I implement a difference-in-differences research design that compares counties that
received a requested disaster declaration to counties that had their request turned down
before and after a disaster event. I use this to isolate the short-term impact of a FEMA
disaster declaration on economic outcomes and inequality. The counties struck by a disaster
severe enough to request FEMA assistance, but who ultimately did not receive a disaster
declaration, will act as a control group, and the counties that were granted a disaster
declaration and thus FEMA assistance are the treatment group. Between 2005 and 2016,
43 out of 50 states experienced both a disaster declaration and a disaster turndown. The
other seven states had significantly fewer disasters in general, and never had a request
turned down by FEMA. Between 2005 and 2016 there were 19,693 FEMA declared
disasters, and 1,929 instances of a disaster declaration request and subsequent federal
turndown. Figure 3.1 shows variation in the number of declared disasters and turndowns
11

during my sample period. There are four stand-out years with more disaster declaration
turndowns than others: 2007, 2008, 2012, and 2015. Another clear outlier is 2005, where
there are many more disasters than usual and of them, few turndowns. This is likely driven
primarily by Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding disasters, which hit in 2005 and
impacted thousands of households across Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana (Braine
2006).

Figure 3.1. Disasters from 2005-2016 broken down into FEMA declared disasters (blue)
and disaster declaration requests turned down by FEMA (red)
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The first clear challenge with this analysis is that the assignment of an emergency
declaration by the federal government is nonrandom. We can expect that some events may
have their request turned down because the event was not severe enough to warrant federal
aid. The FEMA website breaks down the disaster request process, the primary component
of which is an application filled out either by a state governor or tribal council executive.4
The application does not request quantifiable accounts of the severity of the disaster, but
rather asks for descriptive statements about the nature of the disaster, the allocation of state
and local resources to the disaster, and a list of reasons the state, local, or tribal government
cannot supply the necessary aid and resources. As these requests are made before accurate
disaster cost estimates are available, it’s unclear to what extent the severity of the disaster
impacts the declaration decision.
In my primary analysis I focus on four outcome variables, each of which measures
socioeconomic conditions on the county level: poverty rates, unemployment percent,
SNAP benefit enrollment, and inequality. Data on poverty rates is an annual county-level
average obtained from the U.S. Census American Community Survey poverty and income
inequality dataset from 2000 to 2019. Unemployment rate by county is taken from the St.
Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED database from 2000 to 2019. As a proxy for
dependence on public assistance I use data from the USDA Food and Nutrition Service on
SNAP benefit enrollment by household, specifically the fraction of enrolled households in
a county. Lastly, I obtained data on income distribution by county from the American
Community Survey. Due to changes in content and granularity of the ACS, this data was
only publicly available for the years between 2010 and 2019. I use ACS data on estimates
4

<https://www.fema.gov/disasters/how-declared> Accessed April 14, 2021.
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of the percent of households in different income brackets in the county to construct a topto-bottom ratio in every year for each county as a measure of income inequality. The topto-bottom ratio is the percent of households with an income of $100,000 and above divided
by the percent of households in the annual income bracket of $25,000 and under.
I include additional variates in my model to control for county demographics and
disaster type. I create indicator variables for all disaster groups recognized by FEMA:
hurricane, storm, flood, snow, ice storm, earthquake, coastal storm, tornado, fire, and an
“other” category. For county- and year-specific demographic covariates I include median
income, percent Black, percent white, percent Hispanic, percent of the population under 19
years old, percent of the population over 65 years old, total population, and percent female.
I also create an indicator variable to denote swing states based on the criteria of electoral
attention and spending by presidential candidates in the elections of 2004, 2008, 2012, and
2016 (Center for Presidential History 2020). On average across the elections around my
sample, the states that received the most campaign funds and attention relative to their
population were: Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Below I include summary statistics on
the outcomes and covariates of interest in my dataset as well as the results of differenceof-means tests comparing treatment and control counties.
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics for treatment and control groups including disaster and
demographic data at the county level used in my primary analysis between 2005 and 2016

Received Declaration (Treatment)

5

Request Turned Down (Control)

Variable

Mean

S.E.

Mean

S.E.

Difference-ofMeans5

Median Income

44,275

11,168

44,275

11,183

1,663***

Poverty Percent

16.24

0.057

16.49

0.201

0.251

Unemployment Rate

6.38

0.023

6.40

0.089

0.022

SNAP Ratio

0.189

0.002

0.200

0.005

0.013**

Polarity1

0.822

0.002

0.819

0.041

-0.0028

Percent Black

8.59

0.140

13.04

0.550

4.45***

Percent Hispanic

8.15

0.133

6.21

0.271

-1.94***

Percent White

86.31

0.156

82.12

0.582

-4.20***

Percent Pop.< 19 Yrs.

25.96

0.003

26.51

0.010

0.54***

Percent Pop.> 65 Yrs.

16.67

0.004

15.95

0.015

-0.72***

Swing State

0.127

0.003

0.047

0.211

-0.080***

Hurricane

0.236

0.004

0.0054

0.073

-0.231***

Storm

0.380

0.004

0.402

0.016

0.023*

Flood

0.069

0.002

0.043

0.203

-0.009***

Tornado

0.004

0.001

0.156

0.012

0.153***

Snow

0.031

0.002

0.014

0.004

-0.0165***

Fire

0.070

0.002

0.117

0.322

0.051***

Other

0.0002

0.001

0.176

0.013

0.176***

Significant at 10%*, 5%**, and 1%***
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Summary statistics on disaster types can be interpreted as the percentage of the
control or treatment group each type of disaster accounts for. Severe storms play a large
role in both the declared and turned down samples, making up 38% and 40% respectively.
Other disasters that account heavily for turndown observations in my sample are fires,
tornadoes, and “other” disasters. Hurricane disasters appear to be very rarely turned down
and make up a significant portion of the declared disaster category, about 23% more than
the control county significant at the 1% level (Table 3.1). Floods and snow declarations are
also significantly more representative of declarations than turn downs, but do not make up
as much of the treatment sample as hurricanes and storms. Because hurricanes and storms
represent such a large proportion of the disasters in my sample, my results are most likely
primarily driven by the way counties impacted by hurricanes and storms react to the
disaster declaration treatment.
Initial summary statistics suggest that there are significant differences between the
control and treatment groups in my analysis. Most notable of my demographic variables
are white, Hispanic, and Black percentages as well as the swing state indicator. Percent
Black in a county has the largest difference of means result of all other explanatory
demographic factors, suggesting that counties which received turndowns on average have
a Black population 4.45 percentage points greater than those that receive declarations, a
difference that is significant at the 1% level (Table 3.1). On the other hand, the counties
that receive declarations are 4.2 percentage points whiter on average than those that receive
turndowns; this difference is significant at the 1% level (Table 3.1). Hispanic population is
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also 1.94 percentage points greater in the declared group than the turndown group which
the t-test suggests is significant at the 1% level (Table 3.1).
The swing state designation is also significantly different between the treatment
and control groups. Declared counties are in a swing state 12.7% of the time in my analysis,
while counties that experience a turndown any given year are in a swing state only 4.7%
of the time. The difference of means test suggests that federal turndowns occur 8% more
in counties that are not in swing states compared with those that are, significant at the 1%
level (Table 3.1). This result is aligned with the prevailing theory that presidents may be
incentivized to favor providing aid for the states that they feel will be most valuable in their
election or reelection effort (Garrett & Sobel 2003). To explore how swing state status may
be related to race I simply calculated the average county-level Black and Hispanic
percentages for swing states versus the average Black and Hispanic percentages for
counties in non-swing states. I found that the average Black population percentage for the
counties in the swing state group was only 3.9%, which is nearly 7% less than the nonswing state county average of 10.4% Black. There is also a difference in mean percent
between swing and non-swing states for Hispanic percentages, but it is less pronounced: in
swing-state county mean Hispanic population is 7.5% whereas the non-swing state
Hispanic population is 8.7% on average.
This presidential inclination towards aiding swing states with the most electoral
value over others is not only harmful in that non-swing states may get disasters declared
less frequently. It may also be operating more nefariously through channels of systemic
racism, which could leave predominantly Black communities aided less frequently than
white communities. The disparity here is even worse when considering that counties with

17

Black percentages over the mean experience more natural disasters overall. I divide my
sample counties into counties above and below the mean Black population percentage to
analyze event counts through a discrete variable. The average number of events by county
in the majority Black counties during my sample period was 7.3 disasters, while the
average number of disasters for counties below the mean Black percentage was 6.7
disasters in my sample. A t-test suggests that this difference is statistically significant at
the 1% level. This result is in line with other environmental justice research that suggests
that communities of color are and will increasingly become more vulnerable to natural
disasters compared to whiter communities (Bolin & Kurtz 2018).
Prior to conducting my primary regression analysis, I examine factors that explain
variation in the declaration decision in the spirit of Garrett and Sobel (2003). While the
difference-of-means results are quite striking, it is important to control for any other
explanatory variable like disaster type before claiming demographic causality on the
declaration decision. To do this, I estimate a probit model where the dependent variable
takes the value of one if there was at least one disaster declaration in the county-year and
zero if there was a turndown.

18

Table 3.2. Probit Analysis. Probit model results on likelihood of receiving a
declaration including year fixed effects and clustered errors around FIPS code. The
declaration decision is defined as a binary variable which takes on a value of 1 when
declared and 0 when turned down.6

Variable

B

Robust S.E.

P > |z|

-0.00077***

0.00019

0.000

0.00019

0.00028

0.495

Percent Pop. < 19 yr.

-0.00217**

0.00102

0.034

Percent Pop. < 65 yr.

-0.0007

0.00081

0.382

0.0553***

0.00849

0.000

-0.09565***

0.01179

0.000

Hurricane

0.0732***

0.02099

0.001

Tornado

-0.7512***

0.01618

0.002

Fire

-0.13313***

0.01427

0.000

Snow

-0.05712***

0.01801

0.000

Coastal Storm

-0.3883***

0.04124

0.000

Ice Storm

-0.10978***

0.01438

0.000

Flood

-0.06765***

0.01404

0.000

Other Disaster

-0.5152***

0.03283

0.000

Percent Black
Percent Hispanic

Swing State
Storm

*disaster specific coefficients relative to omitted earthquakes

6

Significant at 10%*, 5%**, and 1%***
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A probit analysis allows me to interpret marginal effects as likelihood estimates
which predict the probability of receiving a declaration resulting from a marginal change
in one of my model covariates. Percent Hispanic and percent of the population over 65
years old do not appear to interact significantly with the probability of receiving a
declaration. The other three included covariates, however, do suggest that they are
significant factors in estimating the likelihood of receiving a declaration. Per Table 3.2,
percent Black in a county is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a 1 percentage point
increase in Black population is associated with a 0.07 percentage point decrease in the
likelihood of receiving a declaration. Although this change may seem small, it is significant
evidence that even when controlling for things like disaster type, year, swing states, and
median income, racial composition still has a significant association with FEMA
declaration status. It is important here that I control for the swing state variable, because I
determine a very large gap in receipt of declaration on average for more Black
communities, and those counties are more likely to be in a non-swing state than in a swing
state. Perhaps the relatively small size of the percent Black coefficient results because I
control for the swing state designation in the probit analysis. This analysis also suggests
that historically, holding all else fixed, Black communities have had rejections to disaster
declaration requests significantly more than predominantly white communities, and
therefore the consequences of being denied a declaration I find in my primary analysis are
impactful not only to those counties, but to equity considerations on the federal level.
Percent of the population in a county under the age of 19 also has a significant
association with the probability of receiving a disaster declaration from FEMA. My probit
model suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in percent of the population under 19
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years old is associated with a decreased probability of receiving a declaration by 0.22
percentage points, holding all else equal and significant at the 5% level (Table 3.2). This
is also a significant demographic factor as percent under 19 being greater means that the
population is more heavily demographically weighted toward children.
Swing state analysis in the probit model as with the difference of means summary
statistics demonstrates continued support of the hypothesis that electoral value may sway
the FEMA declaration decision made by the President per Garrett & Sobel (2003). Holding
all else equal, if a county is in a swing state, they are 5.5 percentage points more likely to
receive a disaster declaration than counties that are not in swing states (Table 3.2). This
result seriously calls the mechanisms by which disasters are declared into question.
Counties in non-swing states may be going through the disaster recovery process without
federal aid more frequently than those in swing states partially because they are of less
electoral value.
The results of the probit analysis related to disaster type are interpreted relative to
the omitted disaster type, earthquake. All of the estimated marginal effects for these
variables are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Notably, hurricanes are the
only disaster type more likely to receive a federal disaster declaration than earthquakes (7.3
percentage points more likely). Disasters in the “other” category are much less likely, 51.5
percentage points, to receive a declaration than an earthquake. This result is unsurprising
as requests made for a disaster type of “other” are outside of the typical scope or categories
of disasters that FEMA deals with which could be a basis for rejection. Interestingly,
tornado disaster requests for declaration are 75.1 percentage points less likely to be
declared than earthquakes, which is even more severe than disasters in the “other” group.
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Clearly the type of disaster is a very significant determinant as to whether or not a
declaration will be received, which is why I include disaster type indicator variables in my
primary analysis which I discuss in the following section.

IV.

Main Empirical Strategy

Here I discuss my primary empirical analysis. I exploit a quasi-experimental event
study where all counties (i) in year t that are impacted by a natural disaster request a federal
disaster declaration. Upon request some counties receive a declaration and some do not,
creating a treatment and control group. My empirical model follows a difference-indifferences framework which for each year in my sample period separately estimates the
change in socioeconomic outcomes from the year prior to the year after the disaster:

Yi,t = β0int + β1Posti,t + β2μ + β3δ + β4Declarationi,t + β5Declarationi,t×Posti,t + β6Year + εi,t

Yi,t denotes the outcome variable for my model, which I run separately for all four
outcomes of interest: poverty rate, unemployment rate, SNAP ratio, and income top-tobottom ratio. In my model I include a post dummy variable, which indicates the next year
after the disaster declaration or turndown year. I also include a declaration indicator
variable that takes on the value of 0 if the disaster declaration request is turned down, and
1 if the disaster declaration request is approved. Finally, I include an interaction term
between the post and treatment indicator variables. This term shows the impact of having
a disaster declared versus turned down, comparing the year before and after the disaster
between control and treatment counties. The coefficient of the interaction term will
22

estimate the predicted change in a socioeconomic outcome variable given that a county is
in the post period and that the county was “treated” by receiving a declaration.
As this is a panel fixed effects model, my analysis will naturally control for county
level fixed effects, but it is important to add other controls which may impact the
declaration decision and subsequent community outcome response. I include both disasterspecific controls in my model as well as time varying demographic data. The set of
indicator variables I generated to specify disaster type is included in my model as δ. The
demographic data included in my analysis denoted as μ is a vector of county specific
characteristics in the year of the disaster. These characteristics include population, racial
composition percentages: white, Black, Hispanic; median income, age distribution: above
65 and below 19; and percent female. I also include a Year indicator variable to account
for year fixed effects in my model.

V.

Results
In order to interpret the results of the difference-in-differences models as estimates

of the causal impact of a disaster declaration, the so-called parallel trends assumption must
be satisfied. In this context, the assumption requires no trend differences between the
treatment and control groups for the outcome variables in the years leading up to treatment.
To explore this, I estimate event study models. The parallel trends assumption is used to
confirm that the counties that requested a disaster declaration and were turned down are a
valid counterfactual for those counties that did receive a disaster declaration. If there are
statistically different trends between treatment and control groups in the outcome variables
estimated by the difference-in-differences model in the years leading up to the disaster
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year, then the resulting estimates cannot be interpreted as causal. To estimate the event
studies, I limit my primary analysis to the years 2010 to 2015. Because my disaster specific
and county level demographic data is only available starting in 2006, I require at least four
years of approximated lag year trends to certify whether the parallel trend assumption
holds.
I construct my event analysis using the methods laid out by Clarke and Schythe
(2020) in “Implementing the Panel Event Study''. Because the event of a natural disaster
and corresponding aid acts as a treatment that takes place in different counties at different
times, I include lag variables in my analysis denoted as j, and lead variables indicated by
k. These act as binary variables to distinguish how many periods away the other variables
of interest are from the event, denoted as Eventi. This will set up the panel with an event in
county i and in year t with four binary variables on either side: Lag 4, Lag 3… Lead 0,
Lead 1 (Clarke & Schythe 2020).

Yi,t = β0int +β1Treatmenti,t + β2μ + β3δ + β4Year + λ4(Lag 4) + λ3(Lag 3) + … + γ0(Eventi,t) +
γ1(Lead 1) + εi,t

I create a graph with data points for average outcome variables I observe for each
year. The points on the graphs demonstrate the difference in outcome between my
treatment and control counties in the four years leading up to the disaster event and one
year after with a 95% confidence interval (Figure 4.1 - 4.4). I find from this analysis that
the control and treatment group I designated are unfortunately fairly poor counterfactuals
for one another. This may be due to the fundamental differences I discover between the
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counties that receive a declaration and do not in my Descriptive Analysis section above.
The counties that do not receive a declaration from FEMA seem to trend in fairly different
ways in the four years leading up to their natural disaster than those that do receive a
declaration. Although I control for all time-varying factors included in my Descriptive
Analysis, swing state excluded, this result suggests that there are factors at play other than
just the FEMA declarations that might motivate significant movement and differences in
socioeconomic outcomes between the two groups. It appears from my primary DID
regression analysis that there are numerous correlations between outcome variates and the
post×treatment interaction term significant at the 1% level, however, I cannot assign a
causal interpretation to most of my results. In fact, the only years and outcome variables
that I can potentially interpret as causal are Poverty Percentage in 2010, 2014, and 2015;
Unemployment Rates in 2015, and the Top-to-Bottom income ratio in 2014. The SNAP
ratio never upheld parallel trends for any of my sample years, and therefore although my
results support a possible positive and significant correlation between SNAP ratio and the
post×treatment interaction term, I will not interpret any of these results as causal because
the SNAP ratio trends are significantly different between the declaration and turndown
groups (Figure 4.3).
Below I include the results from my difference-in-differences model on all four
outcome variables. My results display how the interaction term between my post and
treatment variable impacts outcomes for all years 2010 to 2015. Due to data limitations
from changes in the ACS granularity and survey format, I only had the necessary data to
construct a top-to-bottom ratio with adequate lag data to analyze parallel trends beginning
in 2014 and ending in 2015. Additionally, any counties that had multiple observations in
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one year (declare or turndown) are eliminated from these results to avoid interference
between two treatments or the magnification of one treatment. In my results tables I include
the coefficient of the interaction term, the term’s standard error in parentheses below, and
an indication of whether the interaction was found significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or
10% (*) level.
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Table 5.1. Estimates of the coefficient of the interaction term between the post natural
disaster and declaration indicator variable for county level poverty percentage,
unemployment rate, SNAP benefit enrollment fraction, and top-to-bottom ratio of income.

Outcome
Measures:

Poverty Percentage

Unemployment
Rate

SNAP Ratio

Polarity

-0.8194***
(0.2736)

-0.68823***
(0.2552)

-0.0033575
(0.00911)

-

0.15517
(0.25479)

-0.69496***
(0.186605)

0.05106***
(0.00695)

-

0.168194
(0.12978)

0.655444***
(0.080534)

-0.02453
(0.00654)

-

1.2892***
(0.41486)

6.71997***
(0.19843)

0.055166***
(0.01963)

-

2014

-0.36813
(0.368347)

0.0218
(0.30208)

0.053559***
(0.01994)

-0.005078
(0.00458)

2015

-0.21482
(0.19993)

0.43158***
(0.16156)

0.02395***
(0.00453)

0.038184***
(0.00971)

81,930

81,930

61,070

19,929

2010
2011
2012
2013

Observations
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Having used the event study to limit my results to include only those that fit the
parallel trends, I can now interpret my primary results in earnest. I find that once I filter for
counties that are fairly stable counterfactuals for one another and uphold the parallel trends
assumption, there is only one significant interaction term left to interpret. Poverty
percentage in 2010 has parallel trends between declare and turndown counties leading up
to the disaster year. The interaction term in 2010 suggests that receiving a declaration is
associated with a 0.819 percentage point decrease in poverty in the following year relative
to counties that did not receive a declaration, significant at the 1% level (Table 5.1). The
other two years the poverty percentage variable upholds parallel trends (2014 & 2015) also
have a negative coefficient but are not statistically significant, and therefore it is difficult
to draw any finite conclusions based on what appears to be a fairly inconsistent
relationship.

VI.

Discussion

To discuss the findings in my thesis I will start by going over the probit analysis
and difference-of-means findings from my Descriptive Analysis section. This analysis
helps to contextualize the results from my primary difference-in-differences and event
study analyses by illuminating the patterns and influencers of FEMA disaster declarations.
My primary analysis goes on to break down the short-term economic consequences, if any,
of receiving a disaster declaration or not. The results found in my primary analysis are
relevant to the Descriptive Analysis because I find an either a positive or neutral effect of
receiving a declaration. My probit analysis and summary statistics on the factors which
lead to a FEMA declaration versus a turndown show that there are significant factors
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potentially outside of disaster severity which influence the response to county disaster
declaration requests. Finally, I will discuss the shortcomings of my analysis and how they
influence the implications of my results.
I find that the greater population percentage Black a county is the less likely they
are to receive a disaster declaration. There is also evidence in my descriptive statistics that
this relationship between communities of color and having disaster declarations turned
down more frequently could be manifesting through the channel of electoral value. The
that swing states in my sample have a significantly smaller average Black population than
non-swing states, and therefore the swing stage influence likely has racial consequences.
Additionally, I find through my difference of means test and probit model that swing states
are significantly more likely to receive a disaster declaration than non-swing states, holding
all else equal. This reinforces the results from Garrett & Sobel (2003) that the disaster
declaration decision may be in large part motivated by electoral opportunism and attempts
to remain in the favor of residents of the states that will decide an election or reelection for
the individual or the political party. Garrett and Sobel examined this pattern between 1991
and 1999, and the analysis I perform of the time period between 2005 and 2016 suggests
that this trend is alive and well.
A recent, salient example of the politicization of natural disaster aid was the
response of the Trump administration to the five severe California wildfires in 2020.
Former President Trump initially refused to grant a disaster declaration to the impacted
counties in California when Governor Newsom submitted a formal request. The California
fires of 2020 were reported to have destroyed 340,000 acres and caused over 25,000 people
to flee their homes, but the Trump Administration refused to grant a disaster declaration,
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arguing that the submission was “not supported by the relevant data” (Wilson & Elfrink
2020). The sheer magnitude of the damage caused by these fires along with previous threats
to withhold federal disaster aid in response to California’s alleged “liberal irresponsibility”
make it seem that political alignment plays a larger role in federal disaster aid decision
making than it ought to (Wilson & Elfrink 2020).
Ultimately, the Creek Fire and others received a disaster declaration after additional
pressure and scrutiny was applied to the federal government. The disaster was extremely
devastating, and it was fairly obvious that a disaster declaration and aid was deserved and
necessary. It does beg the question, however, for smaller disasters on the severity margins
where they may warrant a declaration or may not; whether these decisions will always be
made fairly. Under the current system, the President faces electoral incentives constantly
and unilaterally makes the decision whether or not to grant natural disaster aid. Given two
identical counties impacted by a disaster with one in a swing state and one not, based on
my analysis and the way the disaster declaration decision operates, I would expect the
county in the swing state to be favored for federal aid over the other.
My primary analysis does not find particularly significant patterns or a consistent
causal association between receiving a disaster declaration and socioeconomic outcomes
in the following year. It is very possible that disaster declaration may be too heavily related
to the damages caused by a given disaster and is therefore influencing the comparison of
outcomes between the two groups. Even if disaster recovery with respect to the
socioeconomic indicators I use in my analysis is much stronger in the presence of a FEMA
declaration, the larger-scale disasters which receive declarations more frequently could
dwarf the impact of the declaration. The disaster itself may be depressing the outcome
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variables I analyze more severely in cases with a declaration than those without. Schulz
and Elliott (2013) suggest that counties may shift in the direction of greater inequality in
the wake of a natural disaster due to a confluence of private and public aid payments, what
they call the “recovery machine”. In the year 2010, my model suggests that receiving a
declaration led to a poverty reduction in the counties that received a declaration in the year
after the disaster compared with the counties that did not receive a declaration. Even if
natural disaster recovery in the U.S. operates in a way that reduces equality after a disaster,
my results suggest that lower income individuals might be better off in the presence of
FEMA aid rather than without federal assistance. Ultimately my findings were more
aligned with the research done by Deryugina (2007) and Pleigner (2020), both of whom
suggested that the social safety nets and disaster recovery strategies in the U.S. are highly
effective at mitigating the adverse economic effects of natural disasters. The one year with
significant findings suggested that receiving a disaster declaration significantly reduced
poverty rate by 0.8 percentage points, and the other years and outcomes turned out to be
insignificant between declared and not declared counties. If the argument made by Schulz
and Elliott (2013) is true and disaster aid allocation is working to harm those at the poorer
end of the economic spectrum and aid those at the wealthiest, it is likely that the pattern is
encouraged more by private and state/local aid rather than FEMA aid as my results on
income inequality did not suggest a significant causal relationship.
One shortcoming of my analysis is that I only observe the difference between the
year before a disaster and the year after for declared and non-declared counties. It is
possible that the effects of receiving a disaster or not may become significant and
identifiable further into the future. The challenge with isolating the longer-term impact is
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that there is no clear pre-treatment and post-treatment period when it comes to natural
disaster declaration. Some counties that receive a declaration in one year may have another
disaster the next and receive a turndown. This is why I only estimated my model for one
year post and prior and I did it separately for every year. The more years one adds to the
analysis, the more challenging it would become to isolate the effects of one disaster from
another if they overlapped in the timeframe.

VII. Conclusion
My findings are a double-edged sword when it comes to understanding the impacts
and motivations behind U.S. natural disaster relief. On one hand, my difference-indifferences model largely suggests that FEMA declarations do not cause socioeconomic
harm or inequality when compared with counties that did not receive a declaration. In fact,
if anything federal disaster aid is a poverty reduction tool which will leave counties better
off after a disaster if they receive a disaster declaration. However, by analyzing a group
largely excluded from past literature, counties that request a disaster declaration and are
rejected, I expose potential significant biases in the U.S. disaster recovery model. There
appear to be factors outside of the natural disaster itself that influence whether or not
federal aid is made available to help counties recover. From a policy perspective, it seems
that there will continue to be an increasing need for disaster support with climate change
hazards predicted to worsen in coming decades. This trend along with increasing political
polarization may lead to a need for the reevaluation of who allocates federal funds for
natural disaster relief. Perhaps future evaluation will find that it has become a conflict of
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interest for the President to have full decision-making power, because it may have adverse
equity impacts on disaster recovery.
Potential future analysis related to FEMA aid allocations could study the hazard
mitigation funding program run through FEMA. My thesis focused only on the disaster
declaration itself and the socioeconomic impacts which could be causally linked to
receiving aid in the post-disaster period. Disaster assistance grants account for a large
portion of the FEMA budget, however they are not the only tool employed by FEMA to
help the U.S. cope with natural disasters. FEMA has a large hazard mitigation budget which
goes to projects that will increase community resilience to future disasters. This can involve
activities from retrofitting buildings in high-risk earthquake areas to building floodwalls.
Past literature has examined the cost-benefit analysis of these mitigation programs and
found that they are an extremely effective and beneficial investment in communities at risk
for natural disasters (Rose et al. 2007). Rose et al. (2007) estimate that the average cost
benefit ratio of a FEMA disaster mitigation program is 4:1, making it an attractive strategy
for reducing the economic impact of natural disasters in the U.S. Future research could
implement a similar methodology as I do when estimating a likelihood function to
determine factors that lead to a declaration, but instead analyze how hazard mitigation
funding is granted. This could be a way to test whether the apparent allocative bias I
determine within FEMA disaster aid is a result of the declaration structure (Presidential
power), or a product of FEMA itself.
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IX.

Appendix

Figure 4.1. Poverty Event Study Graphs (2010-2015). Lags and lead years with 95%
confidence intervals for difference from the disaster year (t = 0)
2010
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2013
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Figure 4.2. Unemployment Rate Event Study Graphs (2010-2015). Lag and lead years
with 95% confidence intervals for difference from the disaster year (t = 0)
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Figure 4.3. SNAP Benefit Ratio Event Study Graphs (2006-2015). Lag and lead years
with 95% confidence intervals for difference from the disaster year (t = 0)
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Figure 4.4. Income Top to Bottom Ratio Event Study Graphs (2014-2015). Lag and
lead years with 95% confidence intervals for difference from the disaster year (t = 0)
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